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1. Approach to the problem.  
In recent years, international migration has made its way to the forefront 
of the security agendas of several states, particularly in Europe and 
North America. The perception of immigration as a threat to security 
has developed alongside the rapid increase in the number of immigrants 
worldwide: while there were approximately 191 million persons living 
outside their countries of origin in 2005, by 2010 this number had 
increased to an estimated 214 million (IOM 2010). In the most general 
sense of the term, security refers to the absence of threats. The 
traditional approach to international security has focused primarily on 
military concerns. From this perspective, the state is the referent object 
needing protection from threatening forces, particularly that of war 
(Krause and Williams 1996:230; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 
2010:23). However, security studies in the post-Cold War era has moved 
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away from the state-centric approach, broadening the definition of 
security to include a number of potential threats (Krause and Williams 
1996:230; Lohrmann 2000:5). Barry Buzan, founder of the Copenhagen 
School of security studies, argues that security studies should not only 
focus on the military sector, but should be further developed to 
encompass societal, environmental, economic, and political security 
(Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010:22-23). Due to the expansion of 
the concept of security, a multitude of issues such as those relating to the 
environment, poverty, and international migration have been labeled as 
security risks or threats (Krause and Williams 1996:230, Lohrmann 
2000:5). Instead of the state as the referent object being threatened, non-
state objects such as humanity, cultural identity, and the individual self 
are considered to be in danger (Huysmans 2006:20). This essay will focus 
on one particular aspect of the security debate: is immigration a threat to 
security? The following pages will investigate the claim that immigration 
is a threat to security by focusing on societal, economic, internal, and 
public security, arguing that immigration is a constructed and perceived 
threat rather than a real, objective danger. Every year approximately 
120,000 immigrants attempt to reach Europe in unsafe and inadequate 
vessels. Such trips are often facilitated by human traffickers based on the 
North African coasts. In 2014 this figure reached 130,000. It is now 
estimated that one million individuals are waiting on the North African 
coast to embark on this journey. The journey across the Mediterranean is 
typically the last step of what is usually a harrowing trip to Europe. The 
countries of origin are usually tainted with conflict, economic and 
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structural problems, and inefficient governance. The decision to 
undertake such a journey is generally one of necessity rather than choice. 
The challenges facing the affected countries are three-fold. Firstly, the 
countries located in the Mediterranean littoral are facing with an 
unfolding humanitarian tragedy. Secondly, there are security concerns 
which cannot be ignored. Thirdly, a possible solution seems elusive. The 
vessels used to cross the Mediterranean Sea are often not seaworthy. 
Moreover, these trips are operated by human traffickers who have little 
regard for the safety and the security of the individuals concerned. 
Approximately 20,000 people are thought to have lost their lives in such 
circumstances over the past twenty years. The hopelessness of the 
situation is compounded by the fact that rescue missions have become 
less frequent and less effective. The European Commission’s rescue 
mission, Operation Triton, was described by the UNHCR as being 
‘woefully inadequate’. It has no operational resources of its own and it is 
entirely dependent on individual voluntary contributions from EU 
member states. The Italian rescue Mission, Mare Nostrum, has registered 
some success and it can be credited with saving the lives of 100,000 
refugees. However, with an operating cost of € 9,000,000 per month, this 
mission is placing a strain on Italy’s finances. When reflecting on this 
situation, Pope Francis spoke on the need for international organizations 
to come together to encourage a common humanitarian solution. 
Political considerations must come second to humanitarian 
considerations. The respect for human life and the dignity of the 
individual must inform all discussions relating to this situation. The 
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immigration crisis is a by-product of a wider security concern; the 
situation is a result of insecurity which in turn leads to more insecurity. A 
cursory look at the country of origin of most migrants reveals that most 
are escaping from hopeless situations in their homeland. At present, the 
situation in sub-Saharan Africa is dire; the rise of Al-Shabaab and Boko 
Haram has displaced a number of individuals whilst other countries, 
such as Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti, are plagued by lawlessness, 
inefficient governmental structures and flagrant human rights abuses. 
The region is torn apart by violent conflicts and instability. 
The Mediterranean itself is also a source of instability; Syria and Libya 
are torn apart by civil conflicts, and the rise of ISIL has destabilised the 
region. Criminal groups are taking advantage of this situation and are 
trafficking individuals. All considerations must take into account the 
security and the dignity of the human being. This can only be met by 
adequate rescue operations and a relentless campaign to prevent human 
trafficking. Nonetheless, there are other security concerns which arise 
from time to time. The Italian media reported that approximately 50,000 
migrants who had applied for asylum couldn’t be traced. They are 
believed to have moved throughout the peninsula or attempted to reach 
other European countries. Health authorities also stated that there were 
two suspected malaria cases whilst a good percentage of migrants seen 
by the health authorities are believed to suffer from scabies. France has 
tightened border security as a result of these developments 
An arrest in May 2015 has also raised some fears about possible 
extremist infiltration in Europe. Abdel Majid Touil, a 22-year-old 
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thought to be linked to the Bardo Museum attack in Tunis, was arrested 
in Milan. He is believed to have arrived in Italy on a migrant ship. Such 
developments have security implications on both a national and a 
regional level. The many reasons that many immigrants head to Europe 
is not as commonly believed to be caused by pull factors, those which 
attract people to a country, but push factor, those which push people out 
of their native countries, such as war or persecution. The economic and 
social pressures on many countries have necessitated that the rules are 
tightened up, and considering that once European citizenship is gained 
the ultimate aim of the European Union is free movement of trade, 
including labor, that the problem that one country faces may be passed 
on to others at a later date. 
The potential problem is illustrated by the number of legal immigrants 
each year, currently standing at one and a half million per annum 
immigrating into Europe. In response to this European policy has been 
to look at designing foreign policy across the Union which is closed and 
looks inward rather than outward. All the nations are agreeing on this 
change of direction, with the only exception being Ireland, which does 
not have a problem with immigration anyway, partly due to its’ location. 
The Maastricht Treaty was designed to promote unity between county 
members and their policies, and they accept publicly that that there is a 
common interest in immigration policies, but despite this all the 
discussions concerning polices concerning such things as asylum are still 
held as quietly and with as little publicity as possible. 
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The attitude taken by countries can be evidenced by the situation in 
Algeria a few years ago, where Charles Pasqua, the Interior Minister, who 
said he would refuse refugees if the Islamic extremists gained power. 
More recently the situation in Bosnia, which is a European country, was 
a demonstration of this reluctance. Many refugees fled for their lives, and 
eventually most European nations did The some refugees, but in 
comparison with the numbers fleeing the amount taken by each country 
were very small, and then only on the basis that they would be returned 
as quickly as possible, despite the condition of the infrastructure of the 
country. The cause of many of the fears regarding immigration come 
from 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down. When this occurred there 
was a mass migration form the east to the perceived prosperous west. In 
all in the first few months that the wall was down over one million 
people immigrated. 
This number of people will have an effect on even the strongest of 
economies, let alone one that is also suffering the costs of unification 
and starting to support and integrate a former poor communist country. 
With all the changes occurring within the world one factor became 
evident for all the countries within the European Union that there had to 
be consensus within the Union on the immigration policy as different 
policies just did not stand up in isolation. However, the European 
Commission remains limited in its powers on this issue. The most 
common policy now for all countries (with the exception of Ireland) is 
that if the potential immigrant is seeking asylum and has come by a 
different European country they will be returned to that country to seek 
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asylum . To make matters worse most countries also have schemes 
where they can keep asylum seekers incarcerated in secure facilities such 
as prisons or camps. Most countries have also changed their state benefit 
system so that asylum seekers will not benefit from the generous 
payments that they would have received in the past. 
If an asylum seeker does enter a country they may face a double 
problem, as in conjunction with the lower, if any, benefits they are also 
restricted form working whilst being assessed for asylum (Islam et al 10). 
Germany changed its asylum laws in 1993 so that any person seeking 
asylum in the country could be returned to their country of origin as long 
as the country was deemed safe (Islam! et al 10). It is not only asylum 
seekers that are seeing immigration rules being tightened up, but also the 
laws which allow international family reunions (Islam et al 10); The 
position of the United Kingdom is not that much different from the rest 
of Europe either. This country once allowed anyone form the 
commonwealth to come and settle in the country which was the reason 
that there was a mass migration into the county from the West Indies in 
the 1950s when the United States tightened up their own boarders. Now 
even some classes of British citizens do not have the right to settle in the 
country. 
The Conservative party who were in power when the legislation was 
passed which changed the immigration laws were criticized in the press, 
by the public, and by the Labor opposition party. However although the 
press and public opinion did not change immediately the position of the 
opposition did change quiet quickly, realizing what a difficult subject it 
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was. When the conservative party undertook interviews regarding the 
maintenance of the country’ boarders there was little if any criticism on 
this publicized subject from the opposition, a very unusual occurrence 
indeed. There was an incident with a FAX transmitted by Jack Straw to 
labor members of the European parliament to ensure that none would 
give any interviews through any of the media (television, radio or 
newspapers) where the position of the opposition was to be questioned 
over the maintenance of border controls in the United Kingdom. This is 
an approach that is still not in line with the rest Europe as by the United 
Kingdom maintaining border controls of this nature as the European 
Union is designed as a borderless entity, with free movement of people 
within the boarders. The European Union has tried to oppose the 
maintenance of the United Kingdom boarders with regards other 
European citizens, but so far has failed to make the British government 
back down on this issue, despite the fact that it is part of the agreements 
set out in the Single European Act. ; European external boarders 
throughout the Union are also being strengthened due to the amount of 
illegal immigrants that are entering the union. The press has even 
nicknamed this move as ‘Fortress Europe’ . The controversy over this is 
not the strengthening of the boarders, but what is actually happened to 
the individuals trying to cross these boarders. 
It has been argued than from a humanist point of view that this is 
immoral as the human rights of these people are being ignored, as there 
are thousands of these potential refugees being turned away each month 
according to The European Council on Refugees and Exiles. These 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety and immigration: the problem of immigration and the European union 
122 
refugees are being turned away with no asylum hearings or other legal 
proceedings. However there is little disagreement being raised anywhere 
in the European Union regarding this policy, as all countries appear to be 
in agreement with each other, afraid of what problems may be brought 
into the country by the immigrants . Limited resistant has been seen in 
the Labor European members of parliament who disagree with this, and 
with the theory of Morgenthau that they seem to be following, one of 
non-intervention in the affairs of other countries. Neil Kinnock, the 
transport minister, and the leader of the socialist in the parliament 
Pauline Green, both have stated that they feel the amount of fear which 
exists over the possible problem with migrations taking place within 
Europe to be misguided and wrong, and therefore that this means that 
they believe the problems of each boarder should be dealt with by the 
nation state who has the boarder without interference from the 
European Union. The right wing parliamentarians all appear to be 
getting their own way when it comes to policy, but with little object form 
the left this is hardly surprising. 
  
2. The Projected Problems of Immigration in Europe.  
Migration is a growing and permanent part of Europe's future. Two 
factors have led to pressure for a more effective EU strategy to promote 
the economic, social, cultural, and political integration of migrants and 
the next generation: recognition of the failure to integrate past migrants 
effectively, and concern about rising support for the far right. European 
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countries have differing views on both the goals of integration and the 
most appropriate strategies to achieve it. Nevertheless, the EU does have 
at its disposal several unique levers to make an effective contribution to 
the development of integration policy, complementing the primary 
responsibility of its member states. Some 13-14 million third-country 
nationals live in the EU, some four percent of the population. A number 
of patterns, however, make the issue more significant than this statistic 
would suggest. Immigrants remain concentrated in particular regions and 
cities, and may remain excluded even after they and their second-
generation offspring have become nationals. EU nationals can 
themselves face barriers to integration outside their own countries but 
within the union (e.g., Portuguese immigrants in Northern Ireland). 
Net migration into Europe is increasing, and is now the largest 
component of population change. Migrants, moreover, come from a far 
wider range of countries, and bring a greater diversity of languages and 
cultures, than in the past. Some European states have only recently 
become countries of immigration, with no experience of integration 
strategies. Migrants bring significant economic and cultural benefits. 
Some newcomers are very successful in the labor market and enjoy 
positive relations with other residents. But there is substantial evidence 
that many face disadvantages on all the key indexes of integration: legal 
rights, education, employment, criminal justice, health, living conditions, 
and civic participation. Moreover, migrants and the second generation 
can be well integrated on one index (such as intermarriage), but not on 
others (such as high unemployment). One of the factors leading to an 
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increased focus on integration at the EU level is the belated recognition 
that migration will be a permanent part of Europe's future. The workers 
who come to fill skills and labor shortages, refugees, overseas students, 
and family members who arrive to join immigrant relatives will require a 
level of incorporation, whether they stay temporarily or permanently. If 
states are to compete for the "brightest and best," potential migrants 
must be confident that they will not face discrimination and exclusion. 
Moreover, EU states cannot afford to neglect the talents of migrants 
already in the workforce. 
Ten new countries will join the EU in 2004, leading to greater mobility 
of migrants (including of Roma communities). A desire to ensure that 
their arrival does not provoke tensions, and that the new EU citizens 
experience equality of opportunity with other EU nationals, also needs 
to be expressed in policy initiatives. Public resentment of migrants and 
fear of difference leads to discrimination, community tensions, and 
occasional violence. In addition, it has contributed to the rise in support 
for far-right political parties, which successfully exploit people's fears and 
resentments. Public anxiety about Muslim minorities (in particular since 
the September 11 terrorist attacks), subsequent international conflicts, 
and vocal hostility towards Muslims in Europe all point to the need for a 
comprehensive integration strategy. 
This need has yet to be addressed effectively at the national level. A 
minority of disillusioned, alienated migrants seeks an alternative sense of 
identity and purpose by joining fundamentalist groups, thereby further 
segregating themselves from mainstream society. The EU has long 
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recognized that integration is a necessary part of a comprehensive 
immigration and refugee strategy. The 1999 European Council in 
Tampere found a new willingness to cooperate in developing that 
comprehensive strategy, addressing integration under the heading of "fair 
treatment of third-country nationals". 
Primary responsibility for integration lies at the national and local levels. 
But EU goals in relation to immigration, economic growth, and social 
cohesion all require a focus on integration. The EU has the ability to 
address a range of issues vital to integration through post-entry rules on 
immigrants and refugees (e.g., in its directive on family reunification); its 
laws on racial and religious discrimination; targeted efforts for migrants 
such as the "Equal" program; and its (currently marginal) attention to 
integration in mainstream strategies on employment, social inclusion, and 
health. 
Since the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, the EU has had a mandate to 
require member states to address discrimination on grounds of race and 
religion. Directives now require member states to legislate on racial 
discrimination in employment, goods, and services; to establish a 
statutory body to provide assistance to individual victims; and to ban 
religious discrimination in employment by December 2003. The JHA 
Council in October 2002 asked the European Commission to come 
forward with proposals for a more comprehensive integration strategy. A 
communication from the European Commission on immigration, 
integration, and employment was published in June 2003. An effective 
EU strategy will have to move beyond the provision of common 
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minimum legal standards and information-sharing to the use of its 
unique levers to promote integration, including: 
1. Establishing a mechanism for dialogue and coordination among 
member states and across the Commission to develop and share 
good practice on essential elements of an integration strategy 
such as induction programes for new migrants. 
2. Reviewing existing and proposed EU immigration and asylum 
measures to ensure that they provide migrants with a secure legal 
status, rights and responsibilities that reflect their temporary or 
permanent status, and the maximum possible access to the rights 
that promote integration—including employment and family 
reunification. 
3. Taking active responsibility for leading a balanced, informed, 
public debate about the reasons migrants are in Europe by 
putting into the public domain information about the 
contribution they make and barriers they experience, 
acknowledging public fears, and correcting misinformation. 
4. Promoting contact between people from different religious and 
cultural backgrounds and building a consensus that racial 
prejudice is socially unacceptable. 
5. Taking steps to promote a common understanding across 
member states of the barriers to integration and of effective steps 
to address them – within and beyond the labor market – through 
data collection, research, monitoring initiatives, and 
dissemination. 
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6. Ensuring implementation of the EU discrimination directives 
and establishment of effective bodies to promote and enforce 
them. 
7. Engaging member states, the social partners, NGOs, and migrant 
organizations, learning from them, sharing ideas on good 
practice, and enabling migrants to contribute to decision-making, 
as an essential element of civic participation. 
8. Conducting a review to identify which EU policies, programs, 
budgets, and policy levers are most relevant to integration, 
including strategies on employment, social inclusion, and health, 
and ensure that integration objectives are mainstreamed within 
them. 
9. Reconsidering the bar on employment of third-country nationals 
within the Commission.  
There have been three obstacles to securing agreement on a substantive, 
EU-wide integration strategy. The first is fear of public resistance to 
migrants, and to EU involvement in their conditions of stay. Second, the 
key levers for integration (such as employment policy and family 
reunification) fall under the authority of different directorates-general at 
the European Commission, different committees in the European 
Parliament, and different ministries at the national level—with the usual 
barriers thus created to developing a coordinated strategy. Third, views 
differ across Europe on the goal of integration and appropriate strategies 
to achieve it. In practice, however, no member state is pursuing any of 
these positions to its extreme. Their own models are not immutable, and 
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are evolving towards greater convergence. The European Commission, 
in its recent communication on integration, set out comprehensive 
measures which, if implemented, would make a significant contribution 
to the economic, social, cultural, and political integration of migrants 
across the European Union. 
The fear of the problems that immigrants will bring to European 
countries which have been in recession and are only just coming out of 
that recession have are summed up by Waddle as the economic and 
social costs that they might incur . In response to this criticism and 
concerns Peter Crampton, another British Labor member of the 
European Parliament has said; "Wardle talks about Turkish workers in 
Germany moving to take British houses and British jobs. What political 
gibberish. Labor should be ramming home that Turkish workers in 
Germany are very often paid much more than many workers in low-
wage Britain and that German social security standards are far higher 
than in the UK". However what he himself is criticized in this is that 
German citizenship is much harder to obtain than that of the United 
Kingdom, even after the rules and regulations have been tightened up. 
Many countries are very concerned about becoming the target of 
countries that have higher unemployment and lower wages, and cost the 
citizens of the nation state their jobs forcing hardship that would not 
occur without immigration. This may seem an extreme view, but when 
we consider that there are 1.5 million immigrants entering Europe legally 
ever year, then in 1991 it was estimated that illegal immigrants in Europe 
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totaled 2.6 million were living in Europe, with an additional 1500,000 to 
300,000 entering each year.  
When it is considered that there are 18 million unemployed people 
looking for work in Europe it becomes easier to see why this subject is 
so sensitive. The issue of foreigners taking jobs has always been an 
emotive subject, it was that which helped cause riots in the United 
Kingdom in the 1940’s, and resulted in violence and deaths with 
immigration laws tightened up. That was in a time with less media 
coverage, and lower unemployment, so the social disruption that might 
follow mass migration may be severe. There are also additional costs 
associated with immigrants other that the opportunity cost of jobs. That 
is the cost incurred by the state of having them move to the country. 
The first cost is the cost to the state in benefits should they not have 
sufficient income to live on. This can amount to several hundred dollars 
a week if there are children. If the family are eligible for help in this way 
they will probably also get help in housing, or housing costs.  
This means that they will either be provided with a home, or have their 
rent paid for them. This is further aggravated by the rules which say that 
if an asylum hearing is taking place then the individual cannot work 
whilst waiting for the outcome of the hearing. During this time, some of 
the benefits are limited, but they are still available, as without them 
people would starve and have nowhere to live. The moral obligation is 
obvious, but in practical terms it raises many questions, and the moral 
arguments get lost in the many cases of asylum seekers that are 
publicized, whether real or not, which are economic refugees rather than 
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refugees from danger. Although the estimate of economic refugees it is 
though is probably overstated but does the governments no harm when 
they are taking a hard line approach to immigration. The social cost is 
not limited to the immediate social security benefit costs, but the on 
going social costs. Unemployment amongst immigrants tends to be 
higher due to the language and cultural difficulties many face when 
moving to another country . Once within the country there may be 
additional family members who want access to the county, this again 
could compound the economic problems . Additionally there are also the 
costs associated with children, not just child benefit costs, but the costs 
of schooling and other social services provided for the family, and the 
family sizes of immigrants, although falling, are still higher than those of 
citizens of the nation state. It also appears that many of these arguments 
may be short term in their perspective, as studies have also shown that 
with second generation immigrants the position is remedied, with the 
individuals seeing themselves as truly citizens of that nation state, with 
over two third saying they would join the armed forces to protect the 
land in which they live . As already mentioned the fear of social unrest 
has also been considered by many states as a significant factor. The early 
1990’s saw the outbreaks of nationalism in many countries, and there 
was much social unrest in Germany that was struggling to cope with the 
large amounts of immigrants that were coming over from the former 
East Germany. III. Conclusion The fear of the unknown is a strong 
driving force, and against a united front of Europe and its legislation the 
Union of Europe starts more to look like the fortress that it has been 
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called in the press. When there are many people turned back without 
even a hearing the system has to be questioned for fairness in the way in 
which it is applied. The states that appear to be most paranoid about the 
invasion of countless immigrants appears to be Germany and the United 
Kingdom, others have slightly more relaxed immigration polices, with 
Ireland being the easiest to gain admission to, however it is also the most 
unlikely cou7ntry for an immigrant to go to because of its location. The 
fears about the costs are also controversial, as although the majority of 
parliamentarians appear to agree in quiet collusion, there are some who 
feel that the potential problems have been overstated, and that as there is 
no evidence for large migrations within the European Union it should be 
down to the discretion of each country to enforce their own policies, and 
not be dictated to by the European Commission.  
However it is very early days within the free movement of labor within 
the European Union, and it may be that these concerns are a reality, 
especially when we consider the amount of people within Europe who 
are looking for jobs, and the number of immigrants currently in the 
region. This would appear to support the view that the jobs may be 
being taken by the immigrants, which if it continued unabated, could 
then lead social and civil unrest, which as well as the inconvenience and 
social problems it causes would also increase other costs such as those of 
policing and property damage. The major objection is usually based of 
the cost of state benefits, and the unaffordability of the states to 
maintain their current level, let alone face further increases, and it is this 
reason that is the main driving force behind the issue, not only due to 
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the immediate cost, but due to the unknown future liability that may be 
brought about by the free movement of labor within the European 
Union.  
The immigration is increasingly interpreted as a security problem. The 
prism of security analysis is especially important for politicians, for 
national and local police organizations, the military police, customs 
officers, border patrols, secret services, armies, judges, some social 
services (health care, hospitals, schools), private corporations (bank 
analysts, providers of technology surveillance, private policing), many 
journalists (especially from television and the more sensationalist 
newspapers), and a significant fraction of general public opinion, 
especially but not only among those attracted to "law and order." The 
popularity of this security prism is not an expression of traditional 
responses to a rise of insecurity, crime, terrorism, and the negative 
effects of globalization; it is the result of the creation of a continuum of 
threats and general unease in which many different actors exchange their 
fears and beliefs in the process of making a risky and dangerous society. 
The professionals in charge of the management of risk and fear 
especially transfer the legitimacy they gain from struggles against 
terrorists, criminals, spies, and counterfeiters toward other targets, most 
notably transnational political activists, people crossing borders, or 
people born in the country but with foreign parents.  
This expansion of what security is taken to include effectively results in a 
convergence between the meaning of international and internal security. 
The convergence is particularly important in relation to the issue of 
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migration, and specifically in relation to questions about who gets to be 
defined as an immigrant. The security professionals themselves, along 
with some academics, tend to claim that they are only responding to new 
threats requiring exceptional measures beyond the normal demands of 
everyday politics. In practice, however, the transformation of security 
and the consequent focus on immigrants is directly related to their own 
immediate interests (competition for budgets and missions) and to the 
transformation of technologies they use (computerized databanks, 
profiling and morphing, electronic phone tapping). The Europeanization 
and the Westernization of the logics of control and surveillance of 
people beyond national polices is driven by the creation of a 
transnational field of professionals in the management of unease. This 
field is larger than that of police organizations in that it includes, on one 
hand private corporations and organizations dealing with the control of 
access to the welfare state, and, on the other hand, intelligence services 
and some military people seeking a new role after the end of the Cold 
War. These professionals in the management of unease, however, are 
only a node connecting many competing networks responding to many 
groups of people who are identified as risk or just as a source of unease. 
(1)  
This process of securitization is now well known, but despite the many 
critical discourses that have drawn attention to the securitization of 
migration over the past ten years, the articulation of migration as a 
security problem continues. Why? What are the reasons of the persistent 
framing of migration in relation to terrorism, crime, unemployment and 
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religious zealotry, on the one hand, and to integration, interest of the 
migrant for the national economy development, on the other, rather than 
in relation to new opportunities for European societies, for freedom of 
travel over the world, for cosmopolitanism, or for some new 
understanding of citizenship? (2) This is the question I want to address 
in this essay. Some "critical" discourses generated by NGOs and 
academics assume that if people, politicians, governments, bureaucracies, 
and journalists were more aware, they would change their minds about 
migration and begin to resist securitizing it. The primary problem, 
therefore, is ideological or discursive in that the securitization of 
migrants derives from the language itself and from the different 
capacities of various actors to engage in speech acts. 
 
3. Immigration and Societal Security.  
The concept of societal security primarily deals with the issue of 
collective identity. As explained by Ole Waever (1993), societal security 
“concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under 
changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (23). In relation to 
international migration, it refers to the ways in which members of a state 
perceive their cultural, linguistic, religious, or national identity to be 
threatened by immigrants. From this perspective, the national values of 
the receiving country is the referent object under threat (Weiner 1992-
1993:103). It is immigration in general, whether voluntary or involuntary, 
legal or illegal, that constitutes this threat, as long as the immigrants pose 
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a challenge to the identity of the receiving state through their different 
language, culture, or religion. The supposed danger of immigration to the 
societal security of a state is not an objective and universal threat, but 
rather a subjective threat, dependent on the ways in which the receiving 
state defines itself (Weiner 1992-1993:110). For instance, while some 
states may view multiculturalism as undesirable, other states may pride 
themselves on their cultural diversity. As explained by Heisler and 
Layton-Henry (1993), in the post-war era, most European states have 
undergone a transformation from fairly homogeneous states, whose 
members have been generally bound by a common sense of cultural and 
ethnic identity, to heterogeneous states made up of several national 
groups (158). In these cases, immigration may be seen as a societal 
security threat as it challenges a state’s traditional national identity and 
core values (Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993:158). Furthermore, the 
inability of immigrants to integrate or assimilate is argued to have a 
negative effect on the society and government’s stability (Heisler and 
Layton-Henry 1993:162). On the other hand, a traditional immigrant-
receiving state such as Canada may hold a different notion of national 
identity and thus may be more tolerant and accepting of different 
languages, cultures, and religions, supporting its policy of 
multiculturalism. In a study of immigration and national identity in 
Germany and Canada, Esses et al. (2006) write that while Canada has 
embraced immigration as essential to its development, Germany’s 
growing immigrant population is an unintended consequence of its 
history of guest worker immigration as well as a large inflow of asylum 
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seekers and refugees (655). Each state’s unique history affects their 
immigration policies as well as whether or not immigration is perceived 
to be a threat to society. For instance, while Canada has supported a 
multiculturalism policy since 1971, aimed at preserving the identities of 
its multi-national groups, in Germany there has been a trend to support 
the assimilation of its immigrant population (Esses et al. 2006:655). 
Furthermore, ethnic and cultural affinity is socially constructed; notions 
of which cultural and ethnic groups are threatening and which are not 
change over time (Weiner 1992-1993:105). What may be deemed as a 
societal threat to one state may be embraced in another, demonstrating 
that immigration is a subjective rather than objective threat to societal 
security that differs between states and can transform over time. The 
securitization of immigration as a threat to the survival of the national 
community is problematic, as it labels the foreign migrant as the “other,” 
ultimately excluding them from society (Huysmans 2000:758). As argued 
by Huysmans (2000), discourse that frames immigration as a threat to 
societal security “reproduces the political myth that a homogeneous 
national community or western civilization existed in the past and can be 
re-established today through the exclusion of those migrants who are 
identified as cultural aliens” (758). The act of securitizing immigration is 
more threatening than immigration itself, as it often results in racism and 
xenophobia, ultimately leading to social disintegration. 
 
4. Immigration and Economic Security.  
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Another way in which immigration has been argued to pose a threat to a 
state’s national interest is through its impact on the state’s economy. 
Immigration has, and will continue to have, a significant economic 
impact on both the receiving country and the country of origin. While 
immigration has economic advantages and disadvantages, the expansion 
of the definition of security to encompass the economic sector has 
brought increased attention to the economic challenges caused by 
immigration, and immigration has, as a result, been labeled as a security 
issue. It is economic migrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers that 
are perceived to threaten the economic security of a state. Labour 
migrants can be argued to pose a threat to the economic security of both 
the sending and the receiving state. According to this argument, the 
emigration of highly skilled and qualified workers from developing 
countries in the global South to developed states in the global North 
results in a “brain drain” in the sending country, as well as undesirable 
economic consequences in the receiving country (Guild 2009:134; 
Weiner 1992-1993:95). However, as argued by Carr et al. (2005), 
emphasizing the notion of “brain drain” on its own ignores the notion of 
“brain gain” (387). While developing countries may lose highly skilled 
workers through emigration, they often gain large numbers of people 
with greater skills back through the process of reverse migration (Carr et 
al. 2005:387-388). Furthermore, remittances transferred to migrants’ 
countries of origin play a significant role in the economic growth and 
development of sending countries (De Haas 2005:1274). According to 
the World Bank, in 2012 remittances surpassed $406 billion; it is 
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estimated that this number will continue to grow, increasing 8% by 2013 
(World Bank 2012). Several studies show that remittances have a positive 
impact on poverty alleviation and financial development. In many 
developing countries, remittances have reduced the percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line: by 11 percentage points in 
Uganda, 6 in Bangladesh, and 5 in Ghana (Sharma 2009:8; Ratha 
2007:p.5). In this sense, economic security overlaps with human security; 
this aspect of immigration has a positive impact not only on the sending 
country’s economy, but also on the physical and financial conditions of 
the sending country’s population. Labeling immigration as a security 
issue overlooks these advantages. Immigration can be argued to pose a 
threat to a receiving country’s economic security through its impact on 
the labour market. Guild (2009) addresses this concern by highlighting 
some key issues: do migrant workers decrease wages in strong 
economies? And, in a strong economy, do immigrants take away jobs 
from native-born workers (135)? Public opinion often supports the 
notion that immigrants depress wages and take away jobs, contributing 
to economic problems (Somerville and Sumption 2009:3). This argument 
is often used to justify restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies. 
However, this perception is based on perception rather than empirical 
facts. According to Chomsky (2007), the theory that the number of 
people determines the number of jobs is a fallacy (7-8). Rather, 
population growth facilitated by immigration creates jobs while 
simultaneously providing people to take these jobs (Chomsky 2007:8). 
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While the economic impact of immigration differs in every state and 
depends on the economic conditions of the time, it can be seen that 
immigration often has a positive impact on the employment levels of the 
host state (Islam 2007:53). For instance, a study on the relationship 
between immigration and unemployment in Canada by Islam (2007) 
concludes that migration does not result in higher unemployment levels 
(63). While it may, in some cases, contribute to temporary 
unemployment, this effect dissipates over time, as the state’s economy 
begins to adjust to the increase in labour supply (Islam 2007:63; 
Somerville and Sumption 2009:9). Islam (2007) finds that “in the long 
run, demand side effect takes place, wages adjust, labour demand is 
restored and thereby Canadian born workers are benefited” (64). 
Complementary to this study, a paper by Somerville and Sumption 
(2009) demonstrates that although the effects of immigration vary from 
state to state, immigration has a minimal impact on wages; in the United 
Kingdom, most workers remain unaffected or even gain from 
immigration (13-14). Evidently, economic immigration does not pose a 
threat to the host state’s economic security. Other factors, such as 
education and demographic change, have a much greater impact on 
labour market opportunities in immigrant receiving countries (Somerville 
and Sumption 2009:3). Contrary to the common public perception that 
immigrants threaten job security, depress wages and lead to an increase 
in unemployment levels, immigration, in reality, can increase job 
opportunities and enhance the economy of the receiving state. 
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It has also been argued that immigrants, particularly refugees and asylum 
seekers, are threats to the receiving state’s social security and welfare 
system. From this perspective, immigration is seen as a problem rather 
than an opportunity. Refugees and asylum seekers are presented as 
profiteers and free-loaders who illegitimately exploit the host state’s 
welfare system, and the welfare system is presented as unable to sustain 
an influx of immigrants (Huysmans 2006:78-79). Immigrants are 
portrayed to be so numerous and poor that they pose a strong economic 
threat to the state, creating housing shortages and straining education, 
transportation, sanitation and communication services (Weiner 1992-
1993:95, 114; Stivachtis 2008:17). As explained by Weiner (1992-1993), 
the provision of welfare state services to migrant workers and refugees 
often spawns resentment from within the local community (114). There 
is a widespread belief that immigrants not only take jobs away from 
native citizens, but that they also take away social benefits (Huysmans 
2006:78). 
The presentation of immigrants as a strain to a state’s social services is 
produced and reproduced through discourse. As argued by Huysmans 
(2000), the use of metaphors referring to “floods” or “invasions” of 
refugees and asylum seekers create the perception that immigrants are 
threat to the host community’s economic security, dramatizing the 
challenges posed by flows of refugees and asylum seekers so that the 
issue appears more threatening (769). A study on the media’s portrayal of 
refugees and asylum seekers in London concludes that inaccurate and 
unbalanced reporting on this aspect of immigration, which often refer to 
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“overwhelming” influxes of asylum seekers and refugees, has resulted in 
a sense of fear and insecurity from the local native community and 
negative perceptions of immigrants (ICAR 2004). Furthermore, it is the 
visibility and noticeability of immigrants that cause them to be used as 
scapegoats for bitterness about wider socio-economic challenges and 
changes (Suhrke 2003:97; Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993:157). As 
written by Heisler and Layton-Henry (1993). 
Economic stringency caused by recession, social changes perceived to be 
uncomfortable, institutional overload and other sources of difficulty 
occurred or were widely remarked after the advent of large-scale 
immigration; therefore these problems, which can be seen as threats to 
social security, are readily attributed to the immigrant presence and 
thereby elevated into problems of societal security (157). Societal and 
economic security are closely connected, as the view of immigrants as an 
economic burden is often caused by the perception of immigrants as 
“others” due to their visible differences.  
Evidently, the argument that immigrants are a threat to a state’s 
economic security is heavily influenced by misconceptions prominent in 
discourse as well as widely held stereotypes about the foreigner. While an 
increased flow of immigrants, specifically refugees and asylum seekers, 
inevitably poses a fiscal challenge which the host state must manage, the 
effects of migration on social spending vary between states and can 
change over time. Moreover, the long-term economic benefits of refugee 
flows should not be overshadowed by the possible short-term costs 
(Stevenson 2005). For instance, studies on the impact of refugees in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety and immigration: the problem of immigration and the European union 
142 
Australia show that the initial costs of accommodating refugees through 
social security benefits are compensated in ten years (Stevenson 2005). 
Securitizing immigration and presenting immigrants as a danger to the 
survival of the welfare system consequently leads to the exclusion of 
immigrants by deeming them undeserving of social services. 
 
5. Immigration and Internal Security.  
In addition to societal and economic security, internal security has also 
emerged as an aspect of security which is threatened by immigration. 
The notion of immigration as a threat to internal security has been 
present since the 1980s (Huysmans 2000:756). As highlighted by 
Huysmans, the Schengen Agreement and Convention of Dublin 
connected immigration to terrorism, international crime, and border 
control (Huysmans 2000:756; Huysmans 1995:53). Since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, immigration has featured prominently on the 
counter-terrorism agenda; governments have tightened immigration 
policies, linking immigration with terrorist activities (Spencer 2008:1). In 
the United States, immigration immediately became a matter of national 
security. President Bush quickly put forth a strategy to combat terrorism 
through immigration policy, and the United States Immigration and 
Naturalization Service was included in the newly established Department 
of Homeland Security (Spencer 2008:2-3), institutionalizing immigration 
as a threat to internal security. Six weeks after 9/11, the USA PATRIOT 
Act was signed into law, strengthening border controls, heightening 
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surveillance of foreign nationals in the United States, and permitting the 
government to detain, prosecute, and remove foreigners suspected of 
terrorist behaviour (Lebowitz and Podheiser 2001-2002:876). 
Immigration policies and border control became instruments in the 
“War on Terror” (Adamson 2006:196). Several scholars support the 
notion that immigration policy must be restricted in order to protect the 
receiving state’s internal security. For instance, Stoffman (2008) argues 
that due to Canada’s high rate of immigration per capita, every 
newcomer cannot be screened thoroughly; consequently, dangerous 
people will enter the country (4). Thus, the most effective way of 
keeping out unwanted immigrants would be through a reduction in the 
annual immigration intake (Stoffman 2008:4). While terrorism is 
undoubtedly a real threat to the internal security of states throughout the 
world, its connection to immigration must be questioned.  
Mueller (2006) persuasively refutes the argument that an absence of 
terrorist attacks in the United States since September 11 is a result of 
increased border control and stricter immigration policies (3). While 
terrorists may have a more difficult time entering the country, hundreds 
of millions of immigrants legally enter the United States each year, and 
1000 to 4000 illegal immigrants each day (Mueller 2006:3). Mueller 
(2006) argues that the threat of terrorism by either national or immigrant 
terrorists has been highly exaggerated (4). Likewise, a study on 
immigration and terrorism in Spain by Saux (2007) maintains that the 
connection between illegal immigration and terrorism is a constructed 
rather than objective reality (p.63). Saux (2007) draws upon Moral-Panics 
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Theory, arguing that the perceived danger of terrorism caused people to 
blame a certain group of people, designating them as the enemy and 
creating a division between “us” and “them” (63). After the September 
11 attacks, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, and the 2005 London 
bombings, immigrants and asylum seekers became labeled as the enemy 
(Saux 2007:63).  
Just as political discourse and the media have portrayed immigrants as a 
threat to societal and economic security, hostile attitudes toward 
immigrants and the apparent connection between immigration and 
terrorism are prevalent in politics and the media. In the periods after 
September 11 and the Madrid bombings, Spanish newspapers 
emphasized a connection between immigration and criminal behaviour, 
influencing political action and public opinion (Saux 2007:62). In the 
days following the September 11 attacks, the urgent need to crack down 
on immigration laws was prevalent in the media and political discourse. 
As shown by Huysmans and Buonfino (2008), in parliamentary debates 
in the United Kingdom after September 11, asylum and immigration in 
general “featured significantly in the political framing of the problem of 
terrorism” (768). Evidently, the connection between immigration and 
terrorism has been reinforced and entrenched in public opinion through 
the practice of discourse.  
As argued by Daniel Griswold of the Cato Institute (2001), immigration 
and border control are two separate issues: terrorist attacks by foreigners 
are not a result of open and liberal immigration policies, but are caused 
by the failure of keeping out the small number of foreigners that do pose 
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a threat to internal security. Similarly, Spencer (2008) points out the 
problems that arise from giving “immigration” the wrong meaning (9). 
Much scholarly writing fails to distinguish between “immigrant” and 
“foreigner” (Spencer 2008:9). In the case of 9/11, the terrorists were not 
immigrants; rather, they entered the United States on temporary visas 
(Spencer 2008:9). The concern of immigration, in general, as a threat to 
internal security disregards the fact that immigrants – those who enter a 
state to permanently settle – make up a small fraction of the entire 
number of foreigners in a state (Spencer 2008:9). Forming a correlation 
between terrorism and immigration is problematic as it has led to the 
alienation, exclusion, and racial profiling of immigrants, particularly 
those who identify as Muslim or Arab, which has a much more tangible 
effect on society (Adamson 2006:196). 
 
6. Immigration and Public Security.  
Similar to how immigration has been connected with terrorism, 
immigration has also been related to increased criminality, resulting in 
the perception that immigration is a threat to public security. The issue 
of whether or not immigration actually results in increased crime rates is, 
again, an issue of perception versus reality. While the public has become 
increasingly concerned about high crime rates intensified by immigration 
and the threat that immigrants pose to public order, these concerns are 
empirically unsound (Wang 2012:743). Contrary to popular opinion, 
several studies on a number of states have found no strong correlation 
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between immigration and criminality. It cannot be denied that in some 
states, there has been a connection between increased immigration flows 
and increased crime rates. There is, indeed, a trend showing that cities 
and countries that have high crime rates tend to have a higher immigrant 
population. For instance, a study found that in 2001, “the proportion of 
the prison population born abroad in Spain was twenty five times higher 
than the proportion of immigrants in the population” (Westbrook 
2010:101). However, as Westbrook (2010) insightfully argues, this has 
much more to do with demographic factors than it does with simply 
having an immigrant status (101). In the case of Spain, the majority of 
immigrants are those who have the highest incidence of criminal 
behavior: single men aged 18 to 35 (Westbrook 2010:101). Thus, in 
examining the relationship between immigration and criminality, 
demographic variables must be taken into account.  
There is an abundance of evidence which demonstrates that the 
correlation between immigration and criminality is very weak or non-
existent. A study of three American neighbourhoods concludes that in 
general, immigration does not lead to increased levels of homicide 
among Latinos and African Americans (Lee et al. 2001:559). Similarly, in 
another study, Butcher and Piehl (1998) conclude that the flow of 
migration has no effect on a city’s crime rate (457). Bell et al. (2010) 
investigate the relationship between immigration and crime during two 
particular periods of large migration flows in the United Kingdom: 
during the wave of asylum seekers in the 1990s and early 2000s, and the 
inflow of economic migrants from EU accession countries beginning in 
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2004 (1). The study reports that neither wave impacted rates of violent 
crime, and that immigrant arrest rates were no higher than native arrest 
rates (Bell et al. 2010:17). Evidently, while widespread public opinion 
holds that immigration is a threat to public security, it is a constructed 
threat, not founded upon empirical facts. 
 
7. Some ideas as a conclusion.  
Undeniably, immigration poses a number of challenges to receiving 
states. Given the expansion of the definition of security to include 
societal, economic, internal, and public security, it is inevitable that 
immigration would be viewed as a threat to society and the economy, as 
well as to internal security and public order. However, as demonstrated 
in this essay, immigration is a perceived threat rather than an objective 
one. While immigration is argued to threaten the national identity of a 
state, the notion of identity is constructed; ideas of national identity and 
notions of which cultural and ethnic groups can be accepted into a 
community inevitably change over time (Weiner 1992-1993:105). In 
terms of economic security, labeling immigration as a security threat 
overlooks the advantages that immigration may have on the 
development of the sending country. Furthermore, immigration can 
increase employment opportunities and immigrants can have a 
significantly positive impact on the host state’s economy. While 
immigration has been increasingly connected to terrorism, particularly 
since September 11, immigration and border control have been wrongly 
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placed in the same category, and the notion of immigration as a threat to 
internal security has been greatly exaggerated. Lastly, contrary to the 
widespread public opinion that immigration is a threat to public security, 
there is little to no correlation between immigration and criminality. The 
act of labeling immigration as a security threat does more to harm society 
than it does to protect it. It often results in xenophobic and racist 
attitudes, the exclusion of immigrant groups, and the perception of the 
immigrant as the undeserving “other” or enemy.  
As already indicated, the development discussed above must be 
understood in direct relation to the diminishing scope of both social 
citizenship rights and human rights in the EU – a change that for 
obvious reasons has been particularly painful for labor migrants from 
poorer countries and asylum seekers. Substantial rights are considered 
costly and fit badly with the neoliberal doctrine (of liberalization, flexible 
labor markets and reduced welfare provisions) that has been the EU’s 
guiding norm for more than 20 years. Governments in the EU have thus 
become much more hesitant to commit themselves to social rights 
provisions for new labor migrants. This partly explains why governments 
do their utmost to avoid the granting of permanent residence to new 
labor migrants. As the Swedish Minister for Migration made clear at the 
Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, 
held in Paris in 2008: “In this context, we must recognize that the old 
paradigm of migration for permanent settlement is increasingly giving 
way to temporary and circular migration.” Despite the continued 
hollowing out of national citizenship rights in the EU, permanent 
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residence – whether obtained through employment, refugee protection, 
for family reasons, etc. – still provides migrants and refugees with a set 
of basic social, civil, and political rights, and thus goes to make up the 
gateway to full formal citizenship. As Castles and Davidson underscore, 
“[t]he pivotal right [for migrants] is clearly that of permanent residence, 
for once a person is entitled to remain in a country, he or she cannot be 
completely ignored”. 
When the Commission now undertakes to establish a common EU 
framework for labor migration it is easy to spot the compatibility 
between the member state reluctance towards migrants’ permanent 
residence and social incorporation, on the one side, and the concepts and 
arrangements around which the Commission suggests an EU framework 
be developed, on the other side. These concepts and arrangements 
include circular migration, temporary residence, seasonal labor and 
return migration. Even though specifically designed for high-skilled labor 
migrants, the EU’s Blue Card scheme also testifies to this development. 
At best, the Blue Card is very vague on the prospects of permanent 
residence for future card holders. What characterizes such arrangements, 
which all member states have individually adopted to a greater or lesser 
extent, is that they entail few social commitments on the part of the host 
state and thus leave little room for substantial rights for the migrants. 
Such rights are for the most part tailored exclusively for permanent 
residents.  To migrate to the EU with one’s much sought-after labor 
has ceased to be synonymous with the simultaneous migration into a 
regime of social rights of citizenship, which eventually became the case 
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in Western Europe during the postwar period’s great labor migration 
boom. This also means that the precarious and rightless position that has 
made “illegal” labor migrants so popular on the EU labor market in 
some important respects now forms the model for how the EU is to go 
about managing its great demand for new “legal” labor migrants. As a 
consequence, the very same people on whom the EU’s future economic 
growth and prosperity are said to depend are offered nothing in return. 
It seems as if the EU wants the poor world’s labor, but not its people, at 
least not in the form of prospective rights-bearing citizens. This points 
to an attempt to further disembled migration policy from policies of 
social incorporation, an attempt which is structurally interlinked with a 
simultaneous effort to capitalize even further on the international 
division of labor by way of establishing this division more firmly and 
tangibly in the heart of Europe itself. This course of action will not only 
risk exacerbating ethno-racial exclusion and adding further tiers to the 
EU’s already multi-tiered labor market; with a militarized migration 
control serving as its ultimate regulator it will also risk worsening the 
migration crisis at the EU’s external borders. If this demonstrates the 
importance of addressing how current migration policy expresses and 
feeds on the political economy of unequal global, regional and 
international relations, it should also highlight the importance of 
restoring the matter of social rights on the migration policy and research 
agenda. Pipe dreams about the arrival of a benevolent, post-political and 
self-regulating migration market just won’t do the job.  
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Capital cities and others principal urban conurbations at the doors of 
Europe and of United States offer many opportunities and an infinitely 
diverse supply of legal and illegal services facilitating international 
mobility. These are strong pulling factors for migrants willing to reach 
their European or American dream with any possible mean. The risks of 
irregular migration are both minimized and fairly well understood by 
would-be emigrants, who weigh them up against their current situation. 
The rationale behind their decision to leave is a bid to improve their own 
living conditions as well as to strengthen the livelihoods of those who 
stay at home through remittances and their potential to broaden the asset 
base. International migration, once started, is a self-sustaining process. 
As such, it is bound to endure in the future unless effective distributive 
policies are implemented between richer and poorer countries, and 
between dynamic and stagnant or declining cities in different countries. 
The emphasis put on “the control against clandestine migration” in the 
EU and US political agendas, through an increasing pressure on transit 
countries’ authorities to stop migration flows, demonstrated to be an 
illusory and unrealistic strategy. With each new border closure, migrants 
have applied original tactics to get around the obstacles, and, what is 
even worse, migration has become criminalized with the expansion of 
smuggling networks. 
Most of all, such an approach is having serious impacts in transit cities, 
where international migration takes place in the total absence of explicit 
policies for protecting migrants’ rights. Local authorities, without even 
having had the time to realise the challenge this phenomenon poses, 
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have been compelled to introduce new prohibitions, restrictions and 
controls, often with no other relevant result than worsening migrants’ 
living conditions. 
Forced by circumstances to spend longer and longer periods in transit 
cities, migrants live and work in precarious situations, de facto deprived 
of even the most fundamental rights such as to live in adequate housing, 
to be free to meet in public spaces, to access healthcare services, to work 
in safe and respectable conditions. The segregation of transit migrants is 
evident, and their vulnerability to iniquity and marginalisation is growing.  
Despite the increasing numbers of foreigners living in these cities, there 
is a great lack of data and research on the issue. Thus local governments 
are still not fully aware of it nor of the consequences, both negative and 
positive, the phenomenon brings with it. Policy makers, first of all, need 
evidence of the potential benefits of international migration as an 
important contribution to the social and economic dynamism of their 
cities. And they also need to understand the costs of failing to manage 
increasingly diverse societies, especially in terms of decay in civic values 
and in the cohesion of urban society as a whole. The arrival of new 
groups of migrants, many of whom settling permanently, might have 
strong impacts on the behaviour of urban population, fluctuating 
between solidarity (because this type of situation is felt so similar to that 
experienced by the many relatives and friends emigrated abroad) and 
rejection, which may sometimes be violent. Due to their limited legal, 
financial and institutional capacities, transit cities are generally 
unprepared to deal with these issues, and would need help for addressing 
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the situation and planning adequate actions. It is out of doubts that EU 
member states or US intervention, when foreseen, should be based on 
ethic and democratic principles, and on human rights respect and 
protection. Instead, national security rather than human security has 
been up to now the main concern of the developed world. Transit 
countries have exploited the situation to bring ahead their political 
objectives. From both sides, all the actions taken have not been directed 
to assisting local stakeholders in making informed choices, but rather to 
influence their policies with the only aim of curbing irregular flows, no 
matter if, at the end of the story, the cost of all this is mainly paid by 
migrants. 
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